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Abstract
This paper studies the link between trade reforms and labor informality in Argentina using
a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period. We explore cross-section mechanisms, that
operate at the industry level, and time-series mechanisms, that operate at a general equilibrium
level. We argue that ﬁrms can substitute formal with informal workers to smooth a negative
trade shock. In this setting, industries exposed to larger tariﬀs cuts could experience increases in
informality. In general equilibrium, there can be additional aggregate impacts in both manufac-
turing and non-traded sectors through workers reallocation between sectors, wage adjustments,
and ﬁrm entry and exit. Using the cross-section variation of the data and an instrumental
variable strategy we explore empirically the cross-section mechanisms. We ﬁnd that reductions
in industry tariﬀs increase labor informality, and the eﬀect is diﬀerentially stronger in indus-
tries with a larger share of small size ﬁrms. Using the time-series variation of the data, we are
able to identify some of the general equilibrium eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the fall in the average
national tariﬀ decreased aggregate informality in the manufacturing sector but increased it in
the non-traded sector.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory indicates that trade liberalization should lead to a reallocation of factors from
protected to comparative advantage sectors, but the empirical evidence for developing countries
often unveils more complex dynamic responses (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004; Menezes-Filho and
Muendler, 2011; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). In the literature, this is typically explained by
limited factor mobility caused by reallocation costs (Atolia, 2007; Artuc et al., 2010; Dix-Carneiro,
2014). In this paper, we focus instead on labor informality as an additional trade adjustment
mechanism. Informality is a relevant margin of adjustment for labor demand and labor supply in
developing countries and this margin of adjustment can be aﬀected by trade reforms (Currie and
Harrison, 1997; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Levy, 2008; Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2011; Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). We build on this literature to explore how trade reforms aﬀect labor
informality and to identify various partial and general equilibrium mechanisms. Following Galiani
and Porto (2010), we exploit a long time series of trade reforms and informality for Argentina.
In the trade literature, ﬁrms respond to tariﬀs cuts by reducing wages and by ﬁring workers
who reallocate to comparative advantage sectors. In turn, if informal workers are “cheaper” than
formal workers, because of various taxes associated with formality, ﬁrms can increase the fraction
of informal workers as an adjustment mechanism. Thus, increasing tax evasion could be a strategy
to smooth the negative trade shock. In this setting, industries exposed to larger tariﬀ cuts could
experience increases in informality. In general equilibrium, there can be additional aggregate im-
pacts in both manufacturing and non-traded sectors. These additional impacts are explained by the
usual trade adjustment mechanisms of workers reallocation between sectors, wage adjustments, and
ﬁrm entry and exit. For instance, as workers reallocate out of an industry, they can get absorbed
into the non-traded sector. To the extent that these workers are employed informally, tariﬀ cuts
can be associated with higher informality in the non-traded sector. However, if, for tax evasion
reasons, exposed industries ﬁre formal workers in higher proportion relative to informal workers,
formal wages may decline with respect to informal wages. Formal workers may become cheaper
and informality may decline, both in manufactures and in non-traded sectors. Further, the loss of
tariﬀ protection can induce ﬁrms to exit the market. As more eﬃcient ﬁrms stay, provided they
are likely to be more formal than smaller exiting ﬁrms, informality can decline as well through this
channel. In the literature, it has been often diﬃcult to disentangle these diﬀerent mechanisms.
In this paper, we study these mechanisms in Argentina using a long time series of tariﬀs and
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individual workers spanning the 1980-2001 period (Galiani and Porto, 2010). During this period,
Argentina experienced a sizeable increase in overall labor informality and important trade policy
changes, leading to substantial time-series and inter-industry variation in tariﬀs for the manufac-
turing sector. Using the cross-section variation in the data, we explore the partial equilibrium
mechanisms. We ﬁnd that trade liberalization, measured as cross-industry reductions in tariﬀs,
raised labor informality at the industry level. Additionally, the magnitude of this eﬀect depends
on the size of the ﬁrms in each industry. When small ﬁrms prevail, we ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms
substitute informal workers for formal workers, but this eﬀect fades away as average ﬁrm size within
industries increases. This can be explained by less eﬃcient tax evasion controls for smaller ﬁrms.
Using the time-series variation of the data, we are able to identify some of the general equilib-
rium eﬀects of trade reforms. We ﬁnd that, conditional on the structure of sectoral protection, the
fall in the average national tariﬀ decreased aggregate informality in the manufacturing sector but
increased it in the non-traded sector. This result can be rationalized with an outﬂow of workers
from manufacturing, a resulting wage adjustment that makes formality cheaper, and the exit of
small ﬁrms because of foreign competition. In the non-traded sector, the evidence suggests that
the inﬂow of displaced manufacturing workers ﬁnds mostly informal jobs.
These results can help explain some of the conﬂicting evidence previously documented in the
literature. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Bosch et al. (2012),
and Paz (2014) ﬁnd no or only limited evidence of a signiﬁcant impact of import tariﬀ reductions
on informality in Brazil and Colombia. By contrast, Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014) report an
increase in labor informality in Argentina and Arias et al. (2013) and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
(2015) a similar eﬀect following liberalization for Brazil and Mexico in the ﬁrst case, and only
for Brazil in the second case. Alema´n-Castilla (2006), on the other hand, predicts a decrease in
informality in Mexico. We argue that these heterogeneous results could be confounded by the
diﬀerent time spans of these studies, and by the diﬀerent mechanisms uncovered by our analysis.
In fact, while the literature on trade and informality emphasizes diﬀerent mechanisms to inter-
pret the diﬀerent empirical results, there is no study recognizing and estimating partial equilibrium
mechanisms as a deviation from general equilibrium trends. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) focus on
labor costs reductions due to increased foreign competition. Alema´n-Castilla (2006) maintains that
the reallocation of market shares and proﬁts from the least productive to the most productive ﬁrms
impacts negatively on the employment share of the informal sector. Similarly, Paz (2014) expects
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a reallocation of market shares between ﬁrms producing domestically and ﬁrms that export, which
may impact on the share of informal workers. Bosch et al. (2012) and Acosta and Montes-Rojas
(2014) investigate the greater access to imported capital goods that may increase productivity as
a mechanism aﬀecting the share of informal workers. Arias et al. (2013) highlight the increase in
the opportunity cost of inactive individuals who could enter the labor force in informal or formal
jobs depending on the entry costs. Finally, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) focus on the imperfect
and slow factor adjustment associated to a trade liberalization episode. In their model, workers
from the regions with larger tariﬀ reductions spend less time in formal employment and transition
mainly into the non-tradable sector, while workers from the non-tradable sector move slowly into
informal employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the relationship
between trade reforms and labor informality in Argentina through simple correlations, and we iden-
tify some of the mechanisms through which this relationship may operate. Section 3 presents our
empirical strategy and the regression analysis to identify the eﬀect of trade reforms on informality
levels. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Trade Reforms and Informality: Adjustment Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce the relationship between trade reforms and labor informality in Ar-
gentina and we identify some of the plausible mechanisms through which this relationship operates.
This discussion illustrates the basic correlations that we study in detail in the econometric section
below and it is intended to motivate the analysis. This ﬁrst look at the data is based on a combina-
tion of tariﬀ protection data with information from repeated cross sections of labor market surveys.
We use the import tariﬀs data at the 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation (a total of 24 manufacturing sectors)
compiled by Galiani and Porto (2010). The information about labor market outcomes comes from
the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), a periodical household and labor force survey with
detailed information on labor market outcomes and individual and household characteristics. The
overlap between the tariﬀ data of Galiani and Porto (2010) and the labor market data from the
EPH allows us to work with a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period.
Table 1 reports yearly sample sizes (wage employees in the manufacturing sector) from EPH
surveys, the average tariﬀ and its standard deviation, and the average labor informality rate for
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manufactures, the non-tradable sector and the aggregate economy.1 We adopt the social protection-
tax evasion deﬁnition of informality, which refers to the nature of the labor relationship between
employer and employee rather than to characteristics of the worker or the ﬁrm (for instance, pro-
ductivity). We classify a worker as informal if the ﬁrm does not pay the statutory payroll taxes
and social insurance contributions based on his or her salary, which implies that the worker is not
registered with the tax and social insurance administrations (we refer interchangeably to infor-
mal or unregistered workers). This implies that the worker does not receive the bundle of social
insurance beneﬁts ﬁnanced by the State—basically, health insurance and the right to a contribu-
tory old age employment-linked pension. This does not necessarily imply that labor informality
is solely a unilateral decision of the worker or the ﬁrm. It can be an outcome from a bargaining
process on employment characteristics, with associated costs (taxes and contributions for the ﬁrm,
which potentially translate into lower wages for workers) and beneﬁts (the social insurance package)
(Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2011). There is a margin of adjustment because workers can have
heterogeneous preferences in their valuation of these beneﬁts, and ﬁrms can also face diﬀerent costs
associated, for instance, to their size through the enforcement of these labor market regulations
(Kleven et al., 2009). The labor informality rate at the industry or aggregate level is simply the
proportion of employees working in these conditions.
The simple descriptive statistics in Table 1 uncover the basic correlation that we study in
this paper: while the average tariﬀ fell 35 percent between 1980 and 2001, the average level of
informality increased by 93 percent over the same period. We further explore this correlation in
Figure 1. During this period, there are two very noticeable episodes of tariﬀ cuts. Protection was
highest in 1980, with an average tariﬀ of around 40 percent (with protection in some industries
reaching 55 percent). The average tariﬀ was cut by 10 percentage points between 1985 and 1989
and, in fact, the entire distribution of industry tariﬀs moved downward (the 75th percentile was,
in general, below the 25th percentile of the ﬁrst two years).2 After 1990, Argentina implemented a
broad program of trade liberalization that included unilateral tariﬀ reductions and the adoption of
Mercosur, a regional trade agreement with neighboring countries Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in
1991. During this period, the mean tariﬀ fell 10 additional percentage points, while tariﬀ dispersion
1We do not include public sector, agricultural and mining workers in our calculations since the EPH is an urban
survey without any coverage of rural areas.
2As noted by Galiani and Porto (2010), this decade was also characterized by the use of non-tariﬀ barriers,
which we do not capture. Non-tariﬀ barriers were, however, fully eliminated by the year 1988. We investigate the
implications of this below. In 1989, there was also an increase in tariﬀs due to a hyperinﬂation crisis.
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also declined.
The informality rate in manufactures, by contrast, exhibited an upward trend over time, more
than doubling between 1980 and 2001. The greatest increase occurred in the 1980s, and it grew
at a slower pace during the 1990s. The informality rate temporarily dropped from 1991 to 1994, a
period of stabilization and growth following the hyperinﬂation episode of 1989-1991. In 1994, the
most signiﬁcant year in terms of labor and other market-oriented structural reforms in the economy,
the informality rate returned to its increasing trend reaching peaks of 31 percent (in 1996) and 35
percent (in 1999). Within manufactures, informality was higher in small industries relative to large
industries, with both showing increasing trends.3 Finally, note that the informality rate in the
non-traded sector was higher than in the manufacturing sector, with a similar increasing trend over
the period.
In the trade literature, ﬁrms typically respond to tariﬀ cuts by reducing wages and by ﬁring
workers. An additional adjustment mechanism that we highlight in this paper is that ﬁrms may
ﬁnd it optimal to change the composition of their employment structure, with less formal jobs and
more informal jobs. They can do so by ﬁring “expensive” formal workers (because of payroll
taxes and social insurance contributions) and hiring other workers informally, or by colluding
with their existing employees and re-negotiating existing employment relationships from formal
to informal (Bergolo and Cruces, 2014). Thus, increasing tax evasion in the form of unregistered
or informal employment becomes a strategy for ﬁrms (and perhaps for workers, if the alternative
is unemployment) to smooth the negative trade shock.
A fundamental premise of our analysis is that the correlation between tariﬀs and labor informal-
ity in the manufacturing sector combines partial and general equilibrium mechanisms. In partial
equilibrium, when labor cannot reallocate across sectors, we should expect eﬀects at the industry
level. These eﬀects are thus more easily pictured by comparing the cross-sectional relationship
between changes in tariﬀs and changes in labor informality across industries. This relationship is
plotted in Figure 2. For all industries (panel A), this correlation is negative, so that industries
exposed to larger tariﬀ cuts experienced an increase in their labor informality rate. Furthermore,
the correlation is much stronger among small size industries (panel B) than among larger indus-
3We use information from the EPH about the size of the ﬁrm where each worker is employed. This information is
categorical in the survey, the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2 to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to
100; 7=101 to 500; 8=501 or more. We classify a ﬁrm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then deﬁne
an industry as small when the share of workers employed in small ﬁrms is 0.5 or larger. In our econometric analysis
we perform robustness tests on this size threshold.
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tries (panel C), where it actually vanishes. This indicates that the use of labor informality as an
adjustment mechanism may diﬀer according to the size of ﬁrms in each industry. The tax-evasion
literature suggests that the detection technology used by the tax authority is a plausible explanation
for these patterns.
To explore general equilibrium eﬀects, we can look at conditional trends (Galiani and Porto,
2010). To do this, we estimate a model using cross-section data where the dependent variable
is the labor informality status of manufacturing workers, and the independent variables are their
individual characteristics, industry tariﬀs, and industry and year indicators. These year dummies
capture the level of informality at diﬀerent periods of time, conditional on the other included
covariates. In Figure 3, we plot this conditional or residual informality rate on the average national
tariﬀ. In panel A, the correlation is positive, indicating that a reduction in labor informality over
time occurred concurrently with the fall of the average national tariﬀ once the eﬀect of cross-industry
tariﬀ diﬀerences was accounted for.
In general equilibrium, informality in the non-traded sector can also be aﬀected by trade policy.
To show this, we estimate the conditional or residual informality rate for the non-traded sector,
and we plot, in panel B of Figure 3, the correlation with the average tariﬀ. In this case, labor
informality in the non-traded sector is negatively correlated with the average national tariﬀ rate.
3 Regression Analysis
In this section, we set up a formal regression analysis to explore the correlations established above.
Our aims are to identify the causal impact of trade liberalization on informality and to disentangle
the diﬀerent mechanisms at work. We estimate the two-step empirical model of Galiani and Porto
(2010) with an instrumental variables estimator. We ﬁrst exploit the cross-sectional variation in
tariﬀs and labor informality to estimate the partial equilibrium mechanisms or within industry
eﬀects. We then rely on our time-series of cross-section data to estimate general equilibrium eﬀects
for the aggregate manufacturing and non-traded sectors.
3.1 Cross-Sectional Mechanisms
We begin with the cross-sectional analysis. Our empirical model is:
(1) yijt = x
0
ijtβx + βτ ln τjt + Ij + Tt + εijt,
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where yijt is the informality status of individual i employed in industry j at time t, τjt is the
tariﬀ on industry j at time t, and the vector x includes individual characteristics, such as gender,
age, marital status, indicator variables for head of household and education, as well as household
characteristics such as the number of children and household income (in equivalent-adult units).
The baseline model also includes industry Ij and time Tt ﬁxed eﬀects.
Following the tax evasion literature discussed above, we expect the eﬀect of trade policy changes
to be diﬀerent depending on ﬁrm size in each industry. Large ﬁrms are more visible and face a
greater probability of detection. As a result, the labor force of a large ﬁrm will be mostly (or fully)
formal. The opposite happens in small-size ﬁrms which face a lower probability of detection and
thus may evade social insurance contributions to a greater extent. We work with two measures of
industry size that arguably capture the tax evasion mechanism that we advocate. For deﬁnition
1, we use EPH data and calculate the shares of workers employed in small-size ﬁrms (ﬁrms with
15 workers or less) in each industry in 1980. The intuition is that industries where small ﬁrms
are more prevalent than large ﬁrms will be less likely to be detected by the tax authorities. For
deﬁnition 2, we deﬁne indicator variables of industry size based on those shares. Concretely, an
industry is deﬁned as small when the share of workers in small ﬁrms is greater than the share of
workers in large ﬁrms in 1980. According to this industry size deﬁnition, 12 out of the 24 industries
were classiﬁed as small.4 We expand model (1) as follows:
(2) yijt = x
0
ijtβx + βτ ln τjt + βsτSj ln τjt + βsSj + Ij + Tt + εijt,
where Sj is the industry size variable, either the share of workers employed in small-size ﬁrms in
industry j (deﬁnition 1) or a small-industry dummy (deﬁnition 2), and Sj ln τjt is an interaction
term with the industry tariﬀ. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term, βsτ , is the part of the impact
of trade on informal employment that depends on the initial share of small-size ﬁrms in the industry
(deﬁnition 1) or the diﬀerential impact of trade on informal employment in initially small industries,
relative to large industries (deﬁnition 2). We expect this interaction term to be negative.
This speciﬁcation allows us to account for several confounding factors for the impacts of trade
policy, βτ and βsτ . Industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects control for industry-speciﬁc characteristics and
aggregate shocks related to business cycles and other policy changes. For instance, if the government
4Appendix C presents results based on alternative cut-oﬀs to deﬁne small and large size ﬁrms. Our results are
robust to these alternative deﬁnitions.
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raises tariﬀs during a recession and workers move from formality to informality, βτ and βsτ could
be biased upward because of the business cycle eﬀect. Time ﬁxed eﬀects also allow us to control
for political economy changes related to the labor market, such as variations in tax regimes and in
social insurance contributions, regulations regarding type of labor contracts, and so on. Similarly,
unobserved industry characteristics that are time invariant, such as the ability to form a lobby,
industry productivity or capital intensity, could aﬀect industry tariﬀs and informal employment
simultaneously. The inclusion of industry ﬁxed eﬀects controls for these unobserved factors that
could be correlated with tariﬀs and have an independent eﬀect on informal employment.
In addition, our data spans a long time series of active trade policy. A before-after comparison of
a single episode of trade liberalization would be missing out the important fact that the comparison
is between an initial pattern of trade protection and another one with lower protection, but not
between autarky and free trade (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). As in Galiani and Porto (2010),
our time series of cross-sections overcomes this limitation by allowing for the comparison of trends
in trade reforms and those in the outcome variable of interest, labor informality.
Even in our setting, where we compare within industry changes along varying trends of trade
liberalization, there might still remain certain omitted factors that can lead to biases. For instance,
industry unionization and lobbying power can achieve lower tariﬀ cuts and more rapid declines in
informality. Alternatively, gains in productivity at the industry level may correlate with higher tariﬀ
cuts (because of lower costs of imported capital goods) as well as with larger declines in informality.5
In order to supplement our OLS results, we also explore instrumental variable models. We work
with two instruments often used in the literature: the initial industry tariﬀ and an industry weighted
average of Argentina’s trade partners exchange rates. More concretely, we interact industry tariﬀs
in the ﬁrst period (1980) with a three-category variable that captures three stages of Argentine
trade policy, namely the initial period with high tariﬀs (years 1980 to 1985), the ﬂat-tariﬀ period
of 1986 to 1989, and the last decade, from 1990 to 2001. A similar approach was proposed by
Topalova (2010). The instrument z1 is deﬁned as:
z1jt = ln τj,1980 ∗ Postt,(3)
where τj,1980 is the initial sectoral tariﬀ and Postt is an indicator variable. The plausible validity
5Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014) report a lower impact of tariﬀs reduction on labor informality in industries that
invest more during the 1992-2003 period in Argentina.
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of this instrument is illustrated in Figure 4. The top panel shows that import tariﬀs fell in all
industries, while the bottom panel shows a diﬀerential pattern of tariﬀ reduction across industries.
Industries that traditionally received the highest level of protection experienced the most drastic
reductions, while industries with the lowest tariﬀ levels in 1980 faced the lowest reductions.
The second instrument z2, the average exchange rate of main trading partners (Park et al.,
2010; Brambilla et al., 2012), is deﬁned as:
z2jt =
X
c
ect ∗ θcj,1980,(4)
where ect is the exchange rate of country c (relative to the Argentine peso) at time t and θ
c
j,1980 is the
share of country c in Argentine imports of product j in 1980. Given this share, a higher exchange
rate of country c will generate higher imports from this country.6 Tariﬀs may increase to protect
industry j, or may fall to secure the gains from trade. This instrumental variable is thus based
on the variation in the exchange rates of all trading partners—a change arguably exogenous to the
model— and on each industry’s exposure to those changes, given their initial share on Argentine
imports of product j. By ﬁxing the shares θcj,1980 at the 1980 level, we seek to predetermine
this value for all t, ensuring that tariﬀ changes generated through exchange rates variations are
exogenous.
Cross-section results are reported in Table 2 for the model that interacts industry tariﬀs with
the share of small-size ﬁrms in each industry in 1980 (deﬁnition 1), and Table 3 for the model
that interacts industry tariﬀs with an indicator variable of small-size industry in 1980 (deﬁnition
2). In both tables, ordinary least squares (OLS) results are presented in panel A and instrumental
variables (IV) results, in panel B. First-stage results of the IV models are reported in panel C. In
all models, standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level.
In column 1, we estimate the model in (1), without interactions with industry size variables.
The eﬀect of the sectoral tariﬀs on labor informality at the industry level (within-industry eﬀect) is
indistinguishable from zero because potentially diﬀerent industry responses cancel out, on average.
In column 2, we allow for heterogeneous eﬀects. In Table 2, we ﬁnd a positive OLS eﬀect of tariﬀs
on informality but a negative interaction with industry size, as expected. In particular, as the
6Since we need to build the instrument for the whole 1980-2001 period, and because of data limitations, we focus
on Argentina’s major trade partners, namely Brazil, Chile, the United States and the European Union. Imports
value data come from UN Comtrade, and exchange rates data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI).
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share of small-size ﬁrms increases, the eﬀect turns negative, indicating a within-industry increase
in the informality rate when tariﬀs fall. As additional robustness tests, we include in column 3 the
average industry wage as a control variable. Our estimated impacts are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly.
This is consistent with the wage adjustment associated with an episode of trade liberalization being
a general equilibrium mechanism that cannot be captured using the cross-sectional variation of the
data. Finally, to account for other potential confounding factors that might be driving the results,
we include initial industry characteristics, namely the share of skilled workers and the size of the
labor force in 1980, interacted with the variable Postt (which captures the trade policy stages).
The results in column 4 indicate that tariﬀ reductions still lead to increases in labor informality
in industries with an initially large share of small-size ﬁrms. The magnitude of the eﬀects is (in
absolute value) larger than before, indicating that confounding factors, if any, were weakening the
estimated impacts.
For further robustness analysis of our estimates, we discuss next the IV results. In panel C
of Table 2, we evaluate the ﬁrst-stage results. The instruments behave relatively well in terms of
statistical signiﬁcance, specially when we include an interaction term with a industry size variables.
However, using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test and the Stock-Yogo critical values, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the instruments are weak.7 Despite this result, the Anderson-Rubin test does
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are irrelevant in the second-stage (when omitting
tariﬀs). Consequently, while the IV results can still show some biases, we believe they are still
useful in better establishing a link between tariﬀs and informality. Turning back to the second-
stage regressions in panel B, we conﬁrm the results in columns 1-4. If anything, the IV results
appear stronger in magnitude.
The lack of an eﬀect in large industries or the reduction in the informality rate reported in
Table 2 can be explained by tax evasion arguments: large ﬁrms face a high probability of detection
and do not resort to labor informality as an adjustment mechanism. An additional explanation can
be found in heterogeneous ﬁrms models of trade. Exporting ﬁrms are larger and more productive
than domestically-oriented ﬁrms (Bernard and Jensen, 1995). Thus, large industries are expected
to have a larger participation of exporting ﬁrms. With trade liberalization these ﬁrms can gain
access to new markets and expand, reducing the participation of informal labor. This behavior may
7Note that while the Stock-Yogo critical values are not valid under clustered standard errors, it is still customary
to use them with the Kleibergen-Paap tests. Montiel Olea and Pﬂueger (2013) introduce a test that is valid for
non-iid errors, but which is only applicable with one endogenous regressor.
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neutralize any increase in informal employment by large ﬁrms producing for the domestic market.
Bustos (2011) provides evidence on the expansion of the exporting segment in Argentine industries
during 1992–1996 in the context of a regional trade liberalization episode (Mercosur).
For completeness, we end this section with a brief discussion of the model that interacts industry
tariﬀs with an indicator variable of small-size industry. These are results are reported in Table 3.
As it can be seen, the estimates in column 1 to 4 behave as before, qualitatively. This provides
additional support to the overall evaluation of the cross-section results.
3.2 General Equilibrium Mechanisms
We now use the time series variability in the data to look at general equilibrium eﬀects—via labor
reallocation and wage adjustment as well as via ﬁrm entry and exit—that cannot be captured
with cross-sectional data. In particular, we investigate the aggregate eﬀect of tariﬀs on both
manufacturing and non-tradable sectors. We study these eﬀects with the strategy proposed by
Galiani and Porto (2010).8 We recover the time ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in model (2) and use
those as measures of the residual informality rate at time t once all the cross-section covariates are
accounted for, i.e., the part of the time-trend that is not correlated with individual characteristics
and specially with industry tariﬀs. Then, in a second step, we regress the residual informality rate
on the average national tariﬀ of the economy weighted by the participation of each industry in total
employment:
(5) Tˆt =m
0
tαm + ατ ln τt + νt,
where m is a vector of controls. Because the dependent variable in this second stage is estimated,
we use weighted least squares with weights given by the inverse of the estimates of the variance of
the time ﬁxed eﬀects from the ﬁrst stage.
Results are provided in Table 4 (using alternatively industry size deﬁnition 1 and industry size
deﬁnition 2 in the ﬁrst step of the procedure (model (2))). The controls included inm in (5) are the
ratio of the labor force in tradable to non-tradable sectors, the average educational level of the labor
8The general idea is that the level of protection of a country (i.e., the average national tariﬀ) has general equilibrium
impacts on informality. However, the economy is not fully ﬂexible in the short-run, so that while there is an underlying
trend in informality that depends on the trend in average protection, there are short-run departures from this trend
(e.g., the within industry results of previous sections). Conceptually, the idea of Galiani and Porto (2010) is to control
for those short-run departures of the trend to extract the general equilibrium eﬀect of tariﬀs.
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force and the proportion of small ﬁrms in each sector. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS coeﬃcients.
The average tariﬀ is positively associated to the labor informality trend in the manufacturing
sector. In columns 3 and 4, we report the IV estimates, where the instrument is the average of
the exchange rate of major trade partners in each period, weighted by the participation of each
industry in total employment.9 The ﬁrst stage results show that this instrument is statistically
signiﬁcant. IV estimates from the second stage show that the average tariﬀ impacts positively
on the labor informality trend of the manufacturing sector (i.e., a reduction in tariﬀs reduces
labor informality), after controlling for the structure of sectoral protection and allowing for general
equilibrium adjustments. Our estimates range between 0.06 and 0.15, indicating a reduction in the
labor informality rate of 0.6 to 1.5 percentage point for each 10% reduction in the national average
tariﬀ.
We can interpret these results as follow. In the cross-section, inter-industry diﬀerences in tariﬀ
cuts increase labor informality being the eﬀect diﬀerentially stronger in industries with a larger
share of small-size ﬁrms. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the loss of proﬁtability of
manufacturing ﬁrms induces them to decrease their formal-informal employment combination so
that informality increases. Given this structure of sectoral protection, however, aggregate labor
informality in manufactures declines with the fall in the national average tariﬀ. This is because of
two reasons. First, the outﬂow of workers and the resulting wage adjustment can make formality
cheaper. Second, foreign competition can lead to ﬁrm exit and these are low productivity ﬁrms
which employ more informal workers.10 In terms of Figure 1, the trend in labor informality in the
manufacturing sector would have been steeper in the absence of trade liberalization.
With a similar reasoning, the non-traded sector may also be aﬀected by the changes in average
protection in manufactures. To explore this, we run the ﬁrst step regressions in Galiani and Porto
(2010) using workers in the non-traded sector (thus excluding the trade policy variables on the
right-hand side). In the second step, we regress the residual average informality rate on the average
national tariﬀ. The results from these estimations are presented in columns 5-8 of Table 4. Both the
OLS (columns 5 and 6) and IV (columns 7 and 8) estimates reveal that aggregate trade protection
aﬀects negatively and signiﬁcantly the labor informality trend in the non-traded sector—i.e., the
fall in tariﬀs increased labor informality in this sector. In particular, the IV estimate is around
9As before, the instrumental variables in the ﬁrst step (model (2))) are z1, z2 and their interactions with indicator
variables of initial size of industries.
10Sa´nchez and Butler (2004) present evidence on the exit of the least productive manufacturing ﬁrms in Argentina
during 1990-2001 as a consequence of tariﬀ reductions.
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–0.11 and –0.13, indicating an increase in the informality rate of the non-traded sector of around
1 percentage point for each 10% reduction in the national average tariﬀ. This can happen if, for
instance, workers that are ﬁred from manufactures because of the lower tariﬀs are absorbed in the
non-traded sector as informal employees. In addition, informality can increase if the non-traded
sector expands and small ﬁrms enter the market. In terms of Figure 1, the trend in labor informality
in the non-tradables sector would have been ﬂatter in the absence of trade liberalization episodes.
3.3 Additional Supporting Evidence: Wage Adjustment
In this section, we study the role of wage adjustment to provide additional supporting evidence for
our results and for the mechanisms we posit. To explore whether sectoral tariﬀs aﬀect the wage
diﬀerential between formal and informal workers in the the cross-section, we estimate a series of
models of the form:
(6) lnwijt = x
0
ijtβx + βddijt + βτ ln τjt + βdτdijt ln τjt
+ βsdτdijt ln τjtSj + βsSj + Ij + Tt + εijt,
where lnwijt is the logarithm of the hourly wage for individual i employed in industry j in t, τjt
is the tariﬀ on industry j at t, and the vector x includes the same set of individual characteristics
as model (1). The variable dijt indicates the labor informality status of worker i in industry j at
time t, and Sj is the industry size indicator (either the share of workers in small-size ﬁrms or a
dummy for small-size industry). Here, the parameters of interest are βdτ and βsdτ , which capture
the diﬀerential impact of tariﬀ changes on the wage of workers with varying informality status at
diﬀerent industry sizes. Ij and Tt are industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
We estimate model (6) by OLS and IV using z1jt and z
2
jt to instrument sectoral tariﬀs, as before.
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Table 5 presents the OLS and IV estimation results. Panel A reports estimates when using the
share of small-size ﬁrms as industry size variable (deﬁnition 1), while panel B reports results when
interacting industry tariﬀs with an indicator variable for small-size industry (deﬁnition 2). Industry
11We also explore instrumental variable models where the informality dijt is instrumented as well. Informality can
be endogenous if a low formal wage, for instance, creates a preference for informal employment or if unobserved factors
such as labor perspectives or job attributes are present. The results appear in Appendix A. In addition, we replicate
the procedure proposed by Paz (2014). Paz estimates a switching regression model where informal and formal wages
are modeled separately as a function of tariﬀs and the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the estimation of a model for
the probability of informal employment. We apply the same methodology and obtain the same conclusion we report
in this sub-section. These results are reported in Appendix B.
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tariﬀs have no eﬀects on the within-industry wage diﬀerential between informal and formal workers
at the usual signiﬁcance levels, regardless the estimation method and regardless the inclusion of
heterogenous eﬀects by industry size. This ﬁnding is consistent with labor informality being the
within-industry mechanism of adjustment when labor cannot reallocate across sectors.
To study the general equilibrium adjustment, we use the identiﬁcation strategy based on the
time-series variability of tariﬀ data presented before. In a ﬁrst stage, we estimate a wage regression
including the interaction between dijt and time eﬀects Tt as additional control variables. The coef-
ﬁcients associated with these interaction terms, bβdt, capture the residual wage diﬀerential between
informal and formal workers in each time period. We estimate this ﬁrst stage separately for the
manufacturing sector (controlling for the sectoral structure of tariﬀs) and for the non-tradable sec-
tor. In the second stage, we use the time dimension of the data and propose a model for the wage
diﬀerential between informal and formal workers in each time period in both sectors (estimated
from the ﬁrst stage) on the average national tariﬀ. The reason to group the estimated eﬀects from
both sectors is that in general equilibrium we expect the wage adjustment to occur for the whole
economy, since workers can move across sectors. We estimate models of the form:
(7) βˆdt = x
0
tαx + ατ ln τt + νt,
where vector x includes the ratio of the labor force in the manufacturing to non-tradable sectors,
the ratio of formal and informal labor force in the whole economy and their educational level. We
obtain the coeﬃcients through weighted least squares, using the inverse of the estimates of the
variance of the eﬀects from the ﬁrst stage as weights.
Table 6 presents our OLS and IV results, where we instrument for the sectoral structure of
protection in the ﬁrst stage using z1jt and z
2
jt, and for the national tariﬀ in the second stage using the
average of the exchange rate of major trade partners in each period, weighted by the participation
of each industry in total employment. Panel A shows the results obtained when the ﬁrst stage
allows for heterogenous impact by industry size using deﬁnition 1, while panel B uses deﬁnition
2. We ﬁnd that, as the average tariﬀ goes down, the relative wage of informal to formal workers
increases over time. This result is valid for the whole economy, i.e. the interaction term between
the national average tariﬀ and the indicator variable for the non-tradable sector is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This is consistent with a general equilibrium wage adjustment whereby workers move
across sectors and industry wage premiums disappear.
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The improvement of informal wages relative to formal wages oﬀers a plausible explanation
of the general equilibrium reduction in the informality rate in the manufacturing sector. When
workers move across sectors, part of the unemployed labor force from the manufacturing industries
is absorbed in the same sector at a lower wage. The reduction in the cost of formal employment
results in a lower informality rate. In the non-tradable sector, the improvement of informal wages
with respect to formal wages indicates that the increase in the informality rate seems due to the
entry of new ﬁrms that start small and informal.
4 Conclusions
This paper examined the link between trade liberalization and labor informality in Argentina using
a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period. This was a period of sizeable tariﬀ cuts and
of increasing labor informality. Following Galiani and Porto (2010), we were able to disentangle
cross-section impacts, that operate at the industry level, and time-series impacts, that operate at
a general equilibrium level. Our ﬁndings indicated, ﬁrst, that trade liberalization increased labor
informality at the industry level, and that the magnitude of this eﬀect depended on the size of
the ﬁrms in each industry. We argued that ﬁrms more exposed to tariﬀ cuts substituted formal
workers with informal workers for tax-evasion reasons and that this eﬀect was diﬀerentially stronger
in industries with a larger share of small size ﬁrms. This result suggests that increasing tax evasion
(in the form of hiring workers informally) worked as a strategy to smooth the negative trade shock.
Second, evidence from time-series variation of the data established that, conditional on the structure
of sectoral protection, labor informality in the manufacturing sector decreased as the average tariﬀ
fell, while the opposite occurred in the non-traded sector. These are general equilibrium eﬀects
caused by the reallocation of workers, the adjustment of relative formal and informal wages, and
ﬁrm entry and exit.
Our ﬁndings using cross-sectional and time series data helped explain some of the seemingly
contradictory results in the previous literature. The empirical results also allowed us to rationalize
some of the adjustments observed in countries following trade liberalization episodes. Moreover,
we validated empirically the intuition that the tax evasion-formality channel is a relevant ﬁrm
adjustment mechanism that allows some smoothing of the eﬀect of the reforms. This additional
adjustment mechanism operates in the sectors exposed to the trade reform, but also in the non-
exposed sectors, and it constitutes a transmission mechanism for general equilibrium eﬀects in
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developing countries beyond those documented for developed countries (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2014).
This may be one of the reasons why governments in developing countries seem reluctant to increase
their enforcement eﬀorts, at least during episodes of reform. While workers suﬀer in the form of
lower quality jobs, this additional margin helps maintain overall employment levels, and this is
the trade-oﬀ faced by economic policy makers. However, by distinguishing between the within-
industry adjustment and the general equilibrium eﬀects, our results also indicated that there is an
additional dimension for this trade-oﬀ. In Argentina’s speciﬁc case, in general equilibrium labor
informality fell in the tradable sector as a consequence of trade liberalization, but it increased in
the non-tradable sector.
While greater labor mobility across sectors is usually seen as desirable, we provided an example
of one more dimension where it would help economies and labor markets adjust to a new equilibrium
with lower costs. In our case, it would allow for a smoother transition to the long-run equilibrium,
avoiding the increase in labor informality and the emergence of unemployment. Moreover, a wider
social protection net not linked to employment (as is the case with most of Latin America’s social
insurance systems) would mitigate the high costs for those workers that lose their social insurance
beneﬁts in the process of adjustment, and would reduce the incentive to evade taxes and hire
workers informally.
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Table 1
Tariﬀs and Informality
Year Obs Tariﬀs Informality
Avg. Std. National Manufactures Non-
dev. Total Small Large Traded
industries industries
1980 1,041 40.95 10.17 20.28 15.62 32.89 10.75 22.94
1985 1,048 31.55 6.37 23.19 17.80 33.76 12.61 25.54
1986 1,146 29.98 6.98 24.78 19.55 34.72 14.95 27.39
1987 2,346 29.39 7.55 26.93 21.12 41.80 14.61 29.71
1988 2,431 29.42 7.54 28.94 23.02 44.51 16.44 31.70
1989 2,459 31.65 8.03 29.30 24.51 43.92 18.37 31.32
1990 1,467 20.56 4.64 27.88 24.99 49.63 18.09 28.96
1991 1,583 15.33 5.51 33.05 29.63 55.09 21.49 34.35
1992 1,629 17.43 4.95 32.99 25.63 46.92 18.57 36.04
1993 1,634 21.34 6.27 33.74 26.81 48.36 19.99 36.51
1994 1,477 20.29 5.73 32.18 26.18 47.44 20.14 34.29
1995 1,345 18.52 3.91 34.42 26.86 47.04 21.71 36.65
1996 1,281 19.21 3.73 36.51 31.32 50.73 24.77 38.07
1997 1,379 19.23 3.98 38.26 30.94 55.85 23.35 40.43
1998 1,359 18.8 4.00 37.84 34.10 57.59 26.91 38.88
1999 1,230 18.6 3.96 38.65 34.49 56.33 27.85 39.68
2000 1,184 18.73 3.46 39.34 33.03 57.84 26.50 40.75
2001 1,085 25.51 5.28 39.07 34.01 54.68 29.20 40.34
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: Number of observations correspond to wage employees in the manufacturing sector. Average tariﬀ
weighted by the employment level in each industry. The informality rate does not include the public sector,
agricultural and mining sectors. To split industries into small and large, we use information from the EPH
about the size of the ﬁrm where each worker is employed. This information is categorical in the survey,
the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2 to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to 100; 7=101 to
500; 8=501 or more. We classify a ﬁrm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then deﬁne an
industry as small when the share of workers employed in small ﬁrms is 0.5 or larger.
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Table 2
Industry tariﬀs and Informality
Interaction with share of small size-ﬁrms at the industry level in 1980
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: Informality status of workers (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) OLS
Log of tariﬀs 0.011 0.044 0.043 0.049
[0.015] [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]**
Log of tariﬀs*S -0.143 -0.144 -0.165
[0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
B) IV - Second-Stage Results: Informality
Log of tariﬀs -0.178 0.087 0.091 0.1
[0.208] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084]
Log of tariﬀs*S -0.202 -0.2 -0.257
[0.054]*** [0.055]*** [0.065]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
C) First-Stage Results: Tariﬀs
Log of tariﬀs
z1 -0.037 -0.168 -0.168 -0.158
[0.066] [0.080]** [0.080]** [0.081]*
z1*S 0.06 0.06 0.061
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.022]***
z2 -0.147 -0.198 -0.198 -0.201
[0.112] [0.107]* [0.107]* [0.111]*
z2*S 0.31 0.31 0.315
[0.220] [0.220] [0.221]
R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Log of tariﬀs*S
z1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.045
[0.024]** [0.024]** [0.024]*
z1*S -0.076 -0.076 -0.073
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
z2 0.024 0.022 0.018
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
z2*S -0.145 -0.147 -0.145
[0.080]* [0.080]* [0.082]*
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F 1.09 2.38 2.38 2.08
Anderson-Rubin Wald F test (p-value) 0.0358 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of sectoral informality on industry tariﬀs. Industry
size S is deﬁned based on the share of small ﬁrms in each industry in 1980. In panels B
and C, z1 is the instrument deﬁned using tariﬀs in 1980; z2 is the instrument based on
exchange rates of main partners. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level
in brackets. The Stock-Yogo critical values for a 5% and 10% maximal IV relative bias are
19.93 and 11.59 in column (1) and 11.04 and 7.56 in columns (2) to (4) respectively.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Table 3
Industry tariﬀs and Informality
Interaction with indicator variable of small size industry in 1980
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: Informality status of workers (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) OLS
Log of tariﬀs 0.011 0.02 0.02 0.023
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Log of tariﬀs*S -0.038 -0.039 -0.045
[0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]**
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
B) IV - Second-Stage Results: Informality
Log of tariﬀs -0.178 -0.021 -0.019 -0.02
[0.208] [0.065] [0.064] [0.067]
Log of tariﬀs*S -0.086 -0.086 -0.105
[0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.037]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
C) First-Stage Results: Tariﬀs
Log of tariﬀs
z1 -0.037 -0.141 -0.142 -0.13
[0.066] [0.068]** [0.068]** [0.072]*
z1*S 0.035 0.035 0.036
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***
z2 -0.147 -0.225 -0.226 -0.229
[0.112] [0.108]** [0.108]** [0.112]**
z2*S 0.255 0.255 0.255
[0.084]*** [0.084]*** [0.084]***
R2 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75
Log of tariﬀs*S
z1 -0.059 -0.061 -0.028
[0.035]* [0.035]* [0.034]
z1*S -0.082 -0.081 -0.078
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
z2 -0.023 -0.028 -0.043
[0.064] [0.064] [0.068]
z2*S 0.051 0.047 0.05
[0.066] [0.066] [0.064]
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F 1.09 4.52 4.52 4.02
Anderson-Rubin Wald F test (p-value) 0.0358 0.0136 0.0133 0.0056
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of sectoral informality on industry tariﬀs. Industry
size S is a dummy variable indicating small industries in 1980. In panels B and C, z1 is
the instrument deﬁned using tariﬀs in 1980; z2 is the instrument based on exchange rates of
main partners. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level in brackets. The
Stock-Yogo critical values for a 5% and 10% maximal IV relative bias are 19.93 and 11.59
in column (1) and 11.04 and 7.56 in columns (2) to (4) respectively.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Table 5
Industry Tariﬀs and Wage Diﬀerentials
Formal and Informal Workers
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: logarithm of OLS IV
workers’ hourly wages (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Deﬁnition 1: Share of small-size ﬁrms in industry
=1 if informal -0.153 -0.112 -0.082 -0.129
[0.095] [0.097] [0.183] [0.193]
Log of tariﬀs 0.034 0.037 0.065 0.02
[0.022] [0.022]* [0.069] [0.063]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs -0.005 -0.025 -0.368 -0.24
[0.029] [0.033] [0.216]* [0.182]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs*S 0.015 0.01
[0.018] [0.023]
Observations 20661 20661 20661 20661
R2 0.38 0.38
B) Deﬁnition 2: Indicator of small size industry
=1 if informal -0.153 -0.122 -0.082 -0.204
[0.095] [0.094] [0.183] [0.222]
Log of tariﬀs 0.034 0.036 0.065 0.017
[0.022] [0.022]* [0.069] [0.065]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs -0.005 -0.021 -0.368 -0.239
[0.029] [0.030] [0.216]* [0.193]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs*S 0.009 0.01
[0.009] [0.011]
Observations 20661 20661 20661 20661
R2 0.38 0.38
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of formal-informal wage diﬀerential and industry tariﬀs. Industry
size S deﬁned based on the share of small ﬁrms in each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy
indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B). Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level
in brackets.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Table 6
Average Tariﬀs and Wage Diﬀerentials
Formal and Informal Workers
OLS and IV estimators
Dep. var.: Residual OLS IV
wage diﬀerential (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Deﬁnition 1: Share of small-size ﬁrms in industry
Log of average tariﬀ -0.116 -0.117 -0.274 -0.358
[0.058]* [0.068]* [0.140]* [0.178]*
Log of average tariﬀ * NT -0.121 -0.108 -0.258 -0.202
[0.105] [0.112] [0.195] [0.216]
Observaciones 64 64 64 64
R2 0.45 0.46
First stage result:
Log of average tariﬀ
Average z2 -0.633 -0.505
[0.190]*** [0.174]***
Average z2 * NT 0.006 -0.044
[0.214] [0.198]
R2 0.34 0.49
Log of average tariﬀ * NT
Average z2 -0.059 0.049
[0.156] [0.143]
Average z2 * NT -0.533 -0.579
[0.176]*** [0.162]***
R2 0.98 0.99
B) Deﬁnition 2: Indicator of small size industry
Log of average tariﬀ -0.116 -0.117 -0.275 -0.358
[0.058]* [0.068]* [0.139]* [0.177]*
Log of average tariﬀ * NT -0.121 -0.107 -0.256 -0.201
[0.105] [0.111] [0.195] [0.216]
Observaciones 64 64 64 64
R2 0.45 0.46
First stage result:
Log of average tariﬀ
Average z2 -0.633 -0.505
[0.190]*** [0.174]***
Average z2 * NT 0.006 -0.044
[0.214] [0.198]
R2 0.34 0.49
Log of average tariﬀ * NT
Average z2 -0.058 0.048
[0.156] [0.143]
Average z2 * NT -0.533 -0.579
[0.176]*** [0.162]***
R2 0.98 0.99
Log relative supply Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log relative supply of informal workers No Yes No Yes
Log relative supply of skilled workers No Yes No Yes
Notes: Times series regressions of formal-informal residual wage diﬀerential on the national average tariﬀ.
Robust standard errors clustered by year and sector level in brackets. Average z2 is the average of the
instrument based on exchange rates of main partners weighted by the participation of each industry in
total employment.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Figure 1
Tariﬀ Reforms and Informality
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
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Figure 2
Changes in Tariﬀs and in the Informality Rate
Cross-Section
A) All Manufacturing
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Regression details: Y=.67--.12(.078)X
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B) Small Size Industries
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C) Large Industries
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010). To split industries into
small and large, we use information from the EPH about the size of the ﬁrm where each worker is
employed. This information is categorical in the survey, the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2
to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to 100; 7=101 to 500; 8=501 or more. We classify
a ﬁrm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then deﬁne an industry as small when the
share of workers employed in small ﬁrms is 0.5 or larger. In our econometric analysis we perform
robustness tests on this size threshold.
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Figure 3
National Average Tariﬀ and Informality in Manufacturing and Non-Traded Sectors
Time-Series
A) Manufacturing Sector
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B) Non-Traded Sectors
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Note: Survey eﬀects from the estimation of a linear model for the infor-
mality status on individual characteristics, industry tariﬀs and industry
and year indicators.
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Figure 4
Changes in Tariﬀ Protection
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Regression details: Y=-6.01--1.17(.351)X
R2= .334
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010). Note: 1 Manufacture of food
products, 2 Manufacture of beverages, 3 Manufacture of tobacco products, 4 Manufacture of textiles,
5 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear, 6 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture
of luggage, handbags, and saddlery and harness, 7 Manufacture of footwear, 8 Manufacture of wood
and of products of wood and cork, except furniture, 9 Manufacture of furniture, 10 Manufacture of
paper and paper products, 11 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, 12 Man-
ufacture of chemicals and chemical products, 13 Manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products
and nuclear fuel, 14 Manufacture of rubber, 15 Manufacture of plastics products, 16 Manufacture of
glass and glass products, 17 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, 18 Manufacture
of basic metals, 19 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, 20
Manufacture of machinery and equipment, except electric, 21 Manufacture of electrical machinery
and apparatus n.e.c., 22 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 23 Manufacture
of medical, precision and optical instruments, 24 Manufacturing industries n.e.c.
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Appendix
A. Robustness check: Instrumenting for informality status
We explore estimating model (6) by IV using z1jt and z
2
jt to instrument sectoral tariﬀs, and instru-
menting the informality status dijt as well. Informality can be endogenous if a low formal wage,
for instance, creates a preference for informal employment or if unobserved factors such as labor
perspectives or job attributes are present. We propose an instrumental variable that is a function
of the informality condition of other household members (Paz, 2014; Pratap and Quintin, 2006;
Olson, 2002):
(8) z3iht =

dhhead,h if i 6= household head
dother,h if i = household head.
If individual i from household h is not the household head we assign as instrument the informal-
ity condition of the household head (dhhead,h), while for household heads we assign as instrument
the average of the informality condition of other household members (dother,h). We consider un-
employed and inactive individuals that do not receive a pension as informal household members.
The validity of the instrument relies on the extension of some of the social security components to
other household members, such as the health insurance.12 The exclusion restriction requires that
the informality condition of other household members could impact on the productivity and wage
received by individual i only through the impact on the informality status.13
The ﬁrst stage results for a wage regression where dijt is the explanatory variable of interest
appeared in table A1. First column shows a positive association between z3iht and dijt, indicating
that the preferences for formality or informality are shared within the household. The result is
conﬁrmed when we control for ﬁrm’s size (second column). Second stage results for model (6) are
in table A2. Our general conclusions regarding the lack of wage adjustment in the cross-section
remain robust.
12Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2011) ﬁnd that secondary workers are less likely to operate formally than primary
workers because they already enjoy some portion of the nonpecuniary beneﬁts generated by the ﬁrst worker.
13The ﬁrst stage for dijt using z
3
iht as instrument captures the impact of tariﬀs on informal employment.
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Table A1: Informal status on the informality condition of other household members
=1 if informal =1 if informal
z3ijt 0.124 0.093
[0.010]*** [0.009]***
Firm size No Yes
Observations 20661 20661
R2 0.19 0.28
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH.
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table A2: Industry tariﬀs and Wage Diﬀerential
Formal and Informal Workers
IV estimation
Dep. var.: Logarithm of workers’ hourly wages (1) (2)
A) Deﬁnition 1: Share of small-size ﬁrms in industry
=1 if informal 1.245 0.038
[1.733] [1.402]
Log of tariﬀs -0.062 -0.035
[0.201] [0.167]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs -0.48 -0.07
[0.582] [0.465]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs*S -0.005
[0.151]
Observations 20661 20661
B) Deﬁnition 2: Indicator of small size industry
=1 if informal 1.245 0.341
[1.733] [1.588]
Log of tariﬀs -0.062 -0.024
[0.201] [0.167]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs -0.48 -0.185
[0.582] [0.514]
=1 if informal*Log of tariﬀs*S 0.019
[0.079]
Observations 20661 20661
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by industry-year in brackets. Industry size S deﬁned based on the share of
small ﬁrms in each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B).
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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B. Robustness check: Switching regression model
Our result variable y (logarithm of hourly wage) is:
y =

y∗2 if y∗1 > 0
y∗3 if y∗1 ≤ 0.
The model is deﬁned by the following three equations:
y∗1 = x
0
1β1 + ε1
y∗2 = x
0
2β2 + ε2
y∗3 = x
0
3β3 + ε3
Error terms have a jointly normal distribution with zero mean and normalized variance σ21 = 1.
The estimation method is the two-step Heckman procedure:
E[y|x, y∗1 > 0] = x
0
2β2 + σ12λ(x
0
1β1)
E[y|x, y∗1 ≤ 0] = x
0
3β3 − σ13λ(−x
0
1β1)
where λ(z) = φ(z)ϕ(z) , and φ(.) is the normal density function and ϕ(.) is the normal distribution.
The probability of informal employment was estimated in the ﬁrst stage controlling for sex,
age and its squared, civil status, indicator variables for education level and household head status,
indicator variables for industry aﬃliation and time periods, and industry tariﬀs. In the second
stage we estimate two wage models, for formal and informal workers, including the inverse Mills
ratio as an additional control variable (λ(z)).
Panel 1 of table A3 shows the results obtained when we instrument for the log of tariﬀs in the
ﬁrst and second stage and the identiﬁcation relies on the non-linearity of the Mills ratio. In panel
2, the selection equation uses an additional regressor for identiﬁcation (z3iht). In both panel we ﬁnd
that industry tariﬀs have no eﬀects on formal and informal wages.
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Table A3: Industry tariﬀs and Wage Diﬀerential
formal and informal workers
Switching regression model
(1) (2)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
A) Deﬁnition 1: Share of small-size ﬁrms in industry
Log of tariﬀs -0.164 -0.297 0.001 -0.126
[1.512] [0.981] [0.283] [0.493]
Log of tariﬀs*S 0.288 0.461 -0.029 -0.050
[2.262] [-3.871] [0.104] [0.213]
Observations 15,489 5,172 15,489 5,172
R2 0.68 0.58 0.68 0.58
B) Deﬁnition 2: Indicator of small size industry
Log of tariﬀs -0.152 -0.234 -0.100 -0.168
[0.126] [0.505] [0.162] [0.383]
Log of tariﬀs*S -0.963 -0.349 -0.034 -0.065
[0.885] [0.678] [0.090] [0.134]
Observations 15,489 5,172 15,489 5,172
R2 0.67 0.56 0.68 0.58
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: 500 bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Industry size S deﬁned based on the share of small ﬁrms in
each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B).
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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C. Robustness checks: industry size deﬁnitions
Our previous estimates were based on a standard criteria regarding industry size categories. The
size threshold we used was 15 employees. In this section, we test whether our results are robust to
alternative size thresholds.
First, we moved the threshold deﬁning small size ﬁrms to 25 employees (option 1). Second,
we moved it to 5 employees (option 2). We then constructed the same two industry size variable
following the previous criteria: the share of workers in ﬁrms of small size in each industry in 1980
(deﬁnition 1), and an indicator variable of small-size industry taking the value 1 when the share of
workers in small size ﬁrms in that industry in 1980 was at least 0.5 (deﬁnition 2).
Tables A4 and A5 report cross-section and general equilibrium impacts, respectively. Columns
1 and 2 in Table A4 summarize cross-section OLS results and Columns 3 and 4 present IV results.
Panel A shows the results obtained when deﬁning industry size according to deﬁnition 1. Columns
1 and 2 shows that tariﬀs have a direct impact on the within-industry informality rate. The impact
is positive in industries with a suﬃciently small share of small-size ﬁrms, and becomes negative
when the share of small-size ﬁrms increases. IV estimates in columns 3 and 4 show that reductions
of industry tariﬀs lead to an increase in the within-industry informality and the impact increases
with the share of small-size ﬁrms. Panel B presents the results when using deﬁnition 2 to construct
the industry size variable. OLS estimates (columns 1 and 2) are robust to the new size threshold
when using option 2 only (small-size ﬁrms deﬁned as 5 employees or less). On the other hand,
IV estimates are fully robust to the two alternative size thresholds employed. Time-series results
reported in Table A5 show that we cannot identify any signiﬁcant impact on the informality trend
in the manufacturing sector at the usual signiﬁcance levels regardless the deﬁnition of industry size,
the estimation method and the size threshold option.
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